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The boom in the securities markets in the 1960s gave companies
ready access to capital. When the boom collapsed at the end of the
decade, companies were forced to find new sources of long-term financ-
ing and new ways to raise capital for acquisitions. Increasingly, com-
panies turned to banks. The stock-for-stock deal, the paradigm
transaction of the 1960s, gave way to cash tender offers and leveraged
buy-outs. Long-term bank financing largely replaced equity financing,
which was no longer available to most companies. This fundamental
change in the way companies financed acquisitions placed commercial
banks in a central, often exposed, position in the public securities mar-
kets.
The financing of takeovers engenders securities law risks for a
bank because of potential confficts arising from the bank's possession
of nonpublic information. For example, although banks owe a duty of
confidentiality to their corporate customers, they are often under inter-
nal pressure to use confidential information in deciding how to respond
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to a request for funds by a company seeking to acquire the customer.
The bank's mere possession of confidential information about a target
company that was formerly a customer may raise problems under the
securities laws if the bank makes a loan to the acquiring company.'
Another serious problem for a bank is liability for its trust depart-
ment's misuse of material nonpublic information obtained by its com-
mercial department. Banks owe duties both to the customers of their
commercial departments not to disclose confidential information and to
the beneficiaries of trusts managed by their trust departments to act
solely in the interest of those beneficiaries.2 To fulfill its investment
duties to trust beneficiaries, a bank must use all the information it has,
which perhaps includes nonpublic information. Its duties to commer-
cial customers, however, require it to keep this same information in
confidence. Banks have sought to avoid this conflict by establishing
"Chinese Walls" to impede the flow of information between their com-
mercial and trust departments, but it is highly questionable whether the
Chinese Wall is an effective solution.
Finally, even when a bank does not itself run afoul of the securi-
ties laws, it can be liable as an aider and abettor of its customers' viola-
tions.3 The prospect of aider-and-abettor liability is enhanced as banks
acquire greater knowledge about the activities of their customers.
This Article discusses the management of nonpublic information
by banks trying to avoid liability arising from conflicting duties, and a
bank's exposure to aider-and-abettor liability under the federal securi-
ties laws. It criticizes the Chinese Wall concept but concludes that the
recent adoption by the Securities and Exchange Commission of an
anti-fraud rule for tender offers makes the Chinese Wall a necessity for
banks.
I. MANAGEMENT OF NONPUBLIC INFORMATION
A. Conflicting Duties Relating to Nonpublic Information.
Banks having access to nonpublic information about their borrow-
ers may face one or more of three conflicts:
1. Conflicting Duties Owed by the Bank in Transactions Involving
Different Customers of the Commercial Department of the Bank. This
conflict arises when one customer asks a bank to finance the takeover
of another customer. The bank must determine whether and to what
. See notes 10-16 infra and accompanying text.
2. See notes 65-70 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 154-74 infra and accompanying text.
1064 [Vol. 1980:1063
Vol. 1980:1063] BANKS AND THE SECURITIES MARKETS
extent it may legitimately use nonpublic information obtained through
its commercial lending relationship with the target company. Although
the commercial loan officers will want to use all available information
in deciding whether the bank should finance the tender offer, the bank
must be careful not to violate either its common law obligation of con-
fidentiality to its borrower or the securities laws' restrictions on the use
of nonpublic information.4
2. Conflicting Duties Owed to Customers of the Commercial and
Trust Departments. In this most commonly recognized conflict, the
bank must attempt to harmonize inconsistent duties: on the one hand,
the bank must maintain confidentiality of nonpublic information about
its commercial borrowers,5 and on the other hand, it must satisfy its
fiduciary obligation to act solely to benefit its trust department custom-
ers.
6
3. Conflicting Duties Owed to Customers of the Trust Department
and to the Securities Markets Generally. As indicated above, a bank
has a fiduciary obligation to act solely in the interests of its trust depart-
ment customers. Yet to avoid liability under the federal securities laws,
a bank must also establish procedures to assure that the trust depart-
ment does not trade on material nonpublic information obtained by the
commercial department.7
These conflicts expose banks to potential liability for breach of
fiduciary and other common law duties and for federal securities laws
violations. Accordingly, banks must be sensitive to these conflicts and
adopt procedures to control the use of material nonpublic information 8
in their possession.
4. See notes 10-39 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 10-39 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 65-70 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 76-126 infra and accompanying text.
8. One of the principal difficulties faced by a bank attempting to control the use of material
nonpublic information is to identify information in that category. The starting point is to distin-
guish the material from the nonmaterial. In TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976),
the Supreme Court held that a fact is material under the securities laws if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in making an investment deci-
sion. Id. at 449. A fact is not material merely because a sophisticated analyst might so regard it.
See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R.
Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2540 (1971).
TSC involved the standard of materiality under rule 14a-9 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's proxy rules. The actual formulation of the rule in the case is that a fact is material
if there is "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote." 426 U.S. at 449.
In formulating its standard of materiality, the Court considered the standards of materiality
developed by the lower courts under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
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B. Possession, Use, or Disclosure of Nonpublic Information by a
Bank's Commercial Department.
The commercial department of a bank may acquire much nonpub-
lic information from current or prospective customers whose securities
are traded in the public securities markets. A customer may be re-
quired to provide nonpublic information pursuant to loan agreements
that call for periodic disclosure of financial and corporate information
or for notice to the bank of material events affecting the business or
financial standing of the customer. In addition, the bank may acquire
information through an audit of a customer's operations, financial
records, and accounting procedures pursuant to a covenant permitting
review at the discretion of the bank. Even without loan covenants re-
quiring disclosure, commercial borrowers generally seek to maintain
good relations with their banks and thus are likely to volunteer non-
public information.
Banks normally use this nonpublic information to stabilize their
lending operations and assure the orderliness and adequacy of com-
mercial credit. For example, a bank may use the information to de-
velop lending expertise in a particular industry or geographic region.
Indeed, the bank and its directors may even have an obligation to the
bank's shareholders to use such information to the fullest extent possi-
ble in order to maintain a competitive position in the commercial bank-
ing field and thus to protect the assets of the bank while achieving a
reasonable return on the shareholders' equity investment. 9 Yet the use
of nonpublic information to remain competitive as a lender may con-
flict with a bank's obligation to its borrower not to disclose or misuse
confidential information obtained through the lending relationship.
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980), promulgated thereunder.
See 426 U.S. at 445 n.8. It is clear from the Court's analysis that its definition of materiality
applies to provisions of the federal securities laws other than the proxy rules, and lower courts
have so read the TSC decision. See, e.g., Lilly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 608 F.2d 55 (2d
Cir. 1979) (applying the TSC standard under rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2159 (1980);
Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1979) (applying the TSC
standard under section 14(e)).
The TSC standard attempts to introduce an objective criterion into the concept of material-
ity: the impact of a fact on a reasonable investor. Nevertheless, materiality is in the eye of the
beholder. In each case presenting this issue, the trier of fact undoubtedly will have his own idea of
whether a particular fact is material. Accordingly, as a practical matter, it is impossible before
litigation to distinguish perfectly the material from the immaterial.
After a bank has decided that a particular item of information concerning a company is
material, it must ascertain whether the information has been publicized. To do this, the bank
must question management, scrutinize the company's filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and examine the company's press releases.
9. See SEC Memorandum 6 n.13.
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1. Possession of Nonpublic Information Obtainedfrom a Commer-
cial Customer. Large commercial banks lend to many companies. Be-
cause banks now play a more important role in financing cash tender
offers and other forms of acquisition, the likelihood has increased that
a bank may be financing the acquisition of a past or present customer.
Mere possession of nonpublic information about a customer does
not itself disqualify a bank from financing the acquisition. Two rebent
cases have considered the argument that a bank possessing nonpublic
information about a commercial department customer violates a /duty
to that customer merely by financing a proposed acquisition: American
Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 10 and
Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp. " In American Medicorp a federal
district court refused to impose a blanket ban on a bank financing the
takeover of one of its customers. The bank's lending activities should
not be automatically constrained, the court stated, simply because the
bank possesses confidential information about the target company.
In Washington Steel, Talley Industries and its subsidiary, TW Cor-
poration, attempted to acquire Washington Steel Corporation by a
tender offer financed by Chemical Bank. Chemical had made loans to
both Washington and Talley, and was a registrar for Washington's
common stock.' 2 In connection with its loan to Washington, Chemical
Bank had received nonpublic information from Washington that in-
cluded cash flow and earnings projections. Washington sued to enjoin
the tender offer, claiming, inter alia, that Chemical had violated a
fiduciary duty not to act adversely to Washington's interests. Accord-
ing to Washington, the duty arose from the prior banking relationship
between the parties and the bank's receipt of confidential information
from Washington. Washington argued that when a bank possesses
confidential information about a customer, the bank violates per se a
duty to the customer by financing its potential acquirer.
The district court in Washington Steel, contrary to the American
Medicorp court, concluded that the bank's possession of confidential
information about the target company created a fiduciary obligation
that the bank had ignored in considering a loan to the offeror.' 3 The
10. 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (an order denying a preliminary injunction).
11. 465 F. Supp. 1100 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd and remanded, 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
12. A registrar of a corporation is responsible for maintaining the company's stock register,
which shows the record ownership of outstanding shares of the company's stock.
13. The court concluded:
Chemical Bank was well aware of its fiduciary obligation to Plaintiff Washington
Steel and Defendants Talley and TW, and as a matter of law the Defendant Chemical
Bank had a duty not to act adversely to the interests of Plaintiff Washington Steel under
the circumstances; and further, the Defendant Chemical Bank had a duty to disclose all
relevant facts which Chemical Bank knew or should have known that were relevant to
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed this comprehensive
rule on appeal. 14 The novelty of the proposed duty and the public pol-
icy of encouraging the free flow of capital caused the court to reject the
per se rule. The court reasoned that the per se rule could destroy or
drastically attenuate the access to banks on which capital venture fund-
ing depends. If a bank could not lend to a company seeking to acquire
a customer about which the bank possessed confidential information,
any company wishing to avoid a takeover could do so by obtaining
loans from major banks and providing them with nonpublic informa-
tion. The court concluded that the per se rule would prevent those
banks not only from financing takeovers but also from financing ordi-
nary competition.' 5 The prospect of this restriction on bank financing
prompted the Third Circuit to endorse the holding of the American
Medicorp court.' 6
2. Disclosure to One Commercial Customer of Nonpublic Informa-
tion Obtainedfrom Another Commercial Customer. While mere posses-
sion of confidential information about a target company does not
trigger liability, the disclosure of it to the acquiring company during
the bank's financing of the acquisition would result in liability for the
•bank. In Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc. 17 the court stated in
dictum that a fiduciary relationship exists between bank and borrower
that prohibits the disclosure of confidential information obtained
through the lender-borrower relationship.' 8 The court concluded that
in light of this special relationship, the potential for conflict would best
be avoided by the "voluntary behavior of the bank itself."' 9
allowing Plaintiff Washington Steel to make an informed decision as to whether or not
Plaintiff Washington Steel should allow a dual agency relationship with adverse parties
to continue.
465 F. Supp. at 1105.
14. 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
15. Id at 599-601. See also Microdot, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., Index No. 1123-76 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Jan. 21, 1976) (case withdrawn); Panel Discussion, Financing and Other Aspects ofCash Tender
Offers, 32 Bus. LAW. 1415, 1421 (1977) (remarks of Mr. Simmons characterizing the assertion of
the per se rule in the Microdot complaint as "sheer nonsense"); Note, Bank Financing ofInvolun.
tary Takeovers of Corporate Customers: A Breach of a Fiduciary Duy, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW.
827, 835 (1978).
16. 602 F.2d at 601.
17. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286, at 92,823 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
18. Id. at 92,829; see SEC Memorandum 6. See also Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474
F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Herzel & Rosenberg, Loans to Finance Tender Offers. The Bank's
Legal Problems, 96 BANKING L.J. 676, 678-79 (1979); Mendez-Penate, The Bank "Chinese Wall'"
Resolving and Contending with Conflicts of Duties, 93 BANKING L.J. 674, 676 (1976).
19. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. at 92,829.
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Federal securities laws also limit a bank's freedom to disclose in-
formation about its customers. For example, a bank's disclosure of
nonpublic information about a target company to a tender offeror
might constitute a tipping violation2o under sectionlO(b) 21 of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act)22 and rule lOb-5. 2 3 Tipping
has been defined as the transmission of nonpublic information by one
having access to such information to a person whom the tipper can
foresee will trade upon that information.24
The Securities and Exchange Commission addressed this problem
in reponse to a request from Senators Proxmire, Sarbanes, and Wil-
liams for comment on the need for new securities legislation.25 The
Commission expressed the view that a bank violates rule lOb-5 as a
tipper by disclosing to a tender offeror nonpublic information about the
target company, if the offeror actually purchases securities without
making the information public. 26 The Commission noted, however,
that if the offeror discontinued the takeover attempt after receiving the
nonpublic information, liability under rule lOb-5 would be less clear
because the disclosure probably would not be "in connection with" ei-
ther the purchase or sale of a security under rule lOb-5. 27
20. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969), on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.), afdin part and rev'd inpart, 446 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005, on remand, 331 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78o, 78p-78hh (1976).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
24. In SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court described the tipping
violation as follows:
It has been the rule of this Circuit for some time that it is a violation of Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 for a person having access to material non-public corporate information
to trade upon or transmit such information under circumstances where it is fp.reseeable
that it will or might be traded upon and a purchase or sale is in fact executed.
Id. at 1057 (citations omitted).
In its recent decision in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court
may have narrowed the rule in SEC v. Lum's, Inc., by suggesting there must be a breach of duty
by a corporate insider as a prerequisite to finding liability for a tipping violation:
"Tippees" of corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10(b) because they
have a duty not to profit from the use of inside information that they know or should
know is confidential and know came from a corporate insider .... The tippee's obliga-
tion has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty.
Id. at 230 n.12 (citations omitted). When a bank receives nonpublic information from a customer
under circumstances that do not constitute a breach of an insider's fiduciary duty, such as where a
member of the customer's management provides the information in connection with obtaining a
loan from the bank, it has now become questionable whether a bank that discloses this informa-
tion to a third party would be liable under the Supreme Court's description of tipping.
25. See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra.
26. SEC Memorandum 6.
27. Id. Rule lOb-5 is restricted to fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." Section 14(e) is limited to fraud "in connection with any tender offer."
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The Supreme Court's recent decision in Chiarella v. United
States2 8 casts doubt on the potential liability of a bank under rule 1 Ob-
5 in the circumstances discussed above. In Chiarella the Court reversed
the conviction under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act of an employee of a
financial printer who had purchased securities on the basis of nonpub-
lic information acquired through his job. The purchases were made in
the public securities markets without communication between Chiarel-
la and his sellers; Chiarella thus made no misrepresentations to the sell-
ers. The only conduct for which he could be liable under rule lOb-5
was his failure to disclose what he knew. The failure to disclose, how-
ever, would have violated rule lOb-5 only if Chiarella had an obliga-
tion to reveal material facts. The Court formulated a test to determine
whether a buyer or seller has such an obligation: the buyer or seller
must be either a corporate insider or a fiduciary of the person with
whom he deals. Since Chiarella was found not to have been a corpo-
rate insider or a fiduciary, he owed his sellers no duty of disclosure.29
The Chiarella Court suggested that it did not intend to overrule cases
holding tippees of corporate insiders liable for trading on nonpublic
information. The Court-viewed tippee liability as being premised on
participation "after the fact" in an insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty.30
Chiarella makes the determination of insider status crucial to lia-
bility under rule lOb-5. For a bank, this issue must be decided by a
thorough review of the banking relationship in-each case. One clear
indication of insider status is the presence of a bank officer or director
on the board of directors of the target company. Such a relationship
played a significant role in one suit against a bank that financed a take-
over attempt.31 Another factor that might create insider status is the
presence of a provision frequently included in loan documents that re-
quires the borrower to maintain management satisfactory to the bank.
Yet even without such a direct relationship with the management of the
target company, a bank could conceivably be deemed to be an insider
solely as a result of the numerous restrictive covenants that commercial
28. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
29. Id. at 232-33. See Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 157 (1968), in which the court held that under California law an intentional failure to dis-
close a material fact in a securities transaction is actionable fraud if there is a fiduciary relation-
ship giving rise to a duty to disclose. The court held that a stockbroker owes such a duty to his
customers. See also General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl.
denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
30. 445 U.S. at 230 n.12. See note 24 supra.
31. See the complaint in Microdot, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., Index No. 1123-76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1976) (case withdrawn).
1070 [Vol. 1980:1063
Vol. 1980:1063] BANKS AND THE SECURITIES MARKETS
loan agreements normally contain. No cases provide direct guidance,
but before Chiarella the Securities and Exchange Commission con-
cluded, on the basis of cases involving departmentalized securities
firms, that the class of insiders extends beyond officers, directors, and
significant shareholders to include "anyone having a special relation-
ship to the company. '32
The Securities and Exchange Commission recently clarified the is-
sue of a bank's liability for disclosing nonpublic information in a
tender offer by adopting rule 14e-3 33 in response to the Chiarella deci-
sion.34 The purpose of the rule, which generally prohibits any person
32. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDy REPORT, supra note 8, at 2539.
33. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,418 (1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3). Before
adopting rule 14e-3 the Commission had proposed an amendment to section 14 of the 1934 Act to
prohibit banks from disclosing nonpublic information obtained from a target company to a tender
offeror or any other person, regardless of whether the offer goes forward, unless the target com-
pany consents to the disclosure. Section 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in
any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
The Commission viewed section 14(e) as sufficient to prohibit banks from disclosing nonpublic
information in tender offers if the tender offers went forward, but recognized the argument that, if
a tender offer is discontinued as a result of disclosure, the disclosure may not have been made "in
connection with" a tender offer under section 14(e). SEC Memorandum 6. The amendment was
thus proposed specifically to extend the reach of section 14 to the case in which a tender offer is
discontinued as a result of the disclosure of information. SEC Memorandum 11.
The text of the proposed amendment is as follows:
e It shall be unlawful for any person who lends all or any part of the consideration to
be used for the purchase of securities pursuant to a tender offer for, or request or invita-
tion for tenders of, any class of equity security, to disclose any material, non-public in-
formation obtained by such person, from the issuer of such class of equity security, to
any other person, unless authorized by such issuer.
SEC Memorandum 10.
34. Rule 14e-3 represents a significant limitation on the holding of Chiarella as it pertains to
tender offers, as Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980), demonstrates.
Kennecott Copper Corporation engaged Morgan Stanley to find a company that Kennecott could
acquire. Morgan Stanley approached Olinkraft Corporation and obtained confidential earnings
projections on the understanding that they would be used only for a possible Kennecott tender
offer. After Kennecott decided not to bid for Olinkraft, Texas Eastern Corporation announced an
offer to acquire control of Olinkraft. Expecting that Texas Eastern would make an even higher
offer, Morgan Stanley purchased approximately 150,000 shares of Olinkraft and then disclosed the
earnings projections it had obtained to Johns-Manville Corporation, which made a higher bid for
Olinkraft and eventually obtained control of the company. Shareholders of Olinkraft sued Mor-
gan Stanley for the profit it made on the 150,000 shares. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint on the ground that no fiduciary relation-
ship existed between Olinkraft and Morgan Stanley. Citing the Supreme Court decision in
Chiarella, the Walton court stated that the "doctrine that a duty to disclose or refrain from trading
arises from a specific relationship between two parties-and not simply from the fact that some
investors have more information than others-is now established in both state and federal law."
623 F.2d at 799 n.6.
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from disclosing nonpublic information relating to tender offers, is two-
fold: to establish a "disclose or abstain from trading" rule for tender
offers35 and to create an explicit anti-tipping rule for tender offers
under section 14(e).36
Under the rule, a bank cannot disclose to a third person nonpublic
information obtained from a customer if a tender offer for the cus-
tomer's stock has been made or is about to commence. Disclosures
made in good faith to the officers, directors, partners, employees, or
advisors of the offeror, however, are not prohibited by the rule. In its
release accompanying the adoption of rule 14e-3, the Commission
Under rule 14e-3, however, the case would come out differently. Morgan Stanley's purchase
of Olinkraft shares after Texas Eastern's bid had begun and while Morgan Stanley possessed
nonpublic information obtained from Olinkraft would violate rule 14e-3(a). In addition, the dis-
closure of the nonpublic information to Johns-Manville might have violated rule 14e-3(d).
35. The text of rule 14e-3(a) is as follows:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has com-
menced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive
or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any
other person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender offer
which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or
has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from (1) the offering person,
(2) the issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or (3) any
officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering
person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such
securities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any
option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a
reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are pub-
licly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
45 Fed. Reg. 60,418 (1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a)) (emphasis added).
36. The text of rule 14e-3(d) is as follows:
(d)(1) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipu-
lative acts or practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act, it shall be unlawful
for any person described in paragraph (d)(2) of this section to communicate material,
nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to any other person under circumstances
in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in a
violation of this section except that this paragraph shall not apply to a communication
made in good faith,
(i) To the officers, directors, partners or employees of the offering person, to its advi-
sors or to other persons, involved in the planning, financing, preparation or execution of
such tender offer,
(ii) To the issuer whose securities are sought or to be sought by such tender offer, to
its officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors or to other persons, involved in the
planning, financing, preparation or execution of the activities of the issuer with respect to
such tender offer, or
(iii) To any person pursuant to a requirement of any statute or rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder.
(d)(2) The persons referred to in paragraph (d)(l) of this section are:
(i) The offering person or its officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors;
(ii) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer or its
officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors;
(iii) Anyone acting on behalf of the persons in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section or
the issuer or persons in paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of this section; and
(iv) Any person in possession of material information relating to a tender offer
which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or
has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from any of the above.
Id. (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d)).
Vol. 1980:1063] BANKS AND THE SECURITIES MARKETS 1073
states that the purpose of this exception is to permit the offeror to com-
municate information to persons involved in the tender offer. Even if it
is assumed that a bank may take advantage of the exception, however,
it has the burden of proving that it communicated the information in
good faith. If the bank knows or has reason to know that the persons to
whom it discloses information will violate rule 14e-3, the bank is a tip-
per in violation of rule 14e-3(d), and the person who acquires the infor-
mation and trades on it is a tippee in violation of rule 14e-3(a).37
Rule 14e-3 will probably be challenged as an invalid exercise of
the Commission's rulemaking authority under section 14(e).38 If it sur-
vives the challenge, the rule will prohibit a bank from disclosing non-
public information about the target to the offeror even if the disclosure
is made in good faith.39
37. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,417 (1980) (release accompanying the promulgation of rule 14e-
3). Presumably, shareholders of the target company would have an implied cause of action
against a bank that violated rule 14e-3 provided that they could prove damages in connection with
the sale of their shares to a recipient of the nonpublic information. See generall, Comment, Im-
plied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation: Harmonization within the Statutory Scheme, 1980
DUKE LJ. 928.
38. The Securities and Exchange Commission's rulemaking authority comes from section
14(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) provides in pertinent part: "The
Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and pre-
scribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative." Undoubtedly, the validity of rule 14e-3 will be questioned. The Supreme
Court in Chiarella described section 10(b) of the 1934 Act in the following terms:
Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it catches must be
fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud
absent a duty to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from
the mere possession of nonpublic market information.
445 U.S. at 234-35. A recent comment on the Chiarella decision noted: "The Court left little
doubt that the duty to disclose enforced by rule lOb-5 must be found outside the securities laws."
Koeltl & Kubek, Chiarella and Market Information, 13 REv. SEc. REG. 903, 906 (1980).
Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, under which rule 14e-3 was adopted, makes it unlawful to
engage in fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative acts in connection with a tender offer. While
section 14(e) requires the Commission to adopt rules and regulations to define and prescribe
means to prevent such acts and practices, it is difficult to understand how this provision gives the
Commission the authority to define fraud under 14(e) in a manner that is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the concept of fraud under section 10(b) as defined by the Supreme Court. As the Court
stated in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 (1976), 'The rulemaking power granted
to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power
to make law." Cf. Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980) (the SEC unsuccessfully argued that
proof of scienter is not required in an enforcement action by the Commission under section 10(b)
even though it is required in a private cause of action for damages under the same provision).
39. The good-faith exception permits communications only to the offeror's officers, directors,
employees, and advisors, and not to the offeror itself. Compare rule 14e-3(d)(l)(ii) (permitting
communication to the issuer whose securities are sought in the tender offer and its officers and
directors, partners, employees, and advisors) with rule 14e-3(d)(1)(i) (permitting communication
only to the officers, directors, partners, employees, and advisors of the offeror). The good-faith
standard makes the bank a virtual guarantor of the actions of those to whom the communication
was made.
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Therefore, in light of the potential for liability, a bank that is con-
sidering financing a tender offer or other acquisition of the securities or
assets of one of its corporate borrowers should avoid disclosing non-
public information to the acquiring company. Even if the bank takes
appropriate precautions, however, it must recognize that once it decides
to finance an acquisition involving two of its customers the bank will
likely be joined in the securities litigation that invariably accompanies
contested tender offers. The fact that the takeover involves two of its
customers would almost certainly provoke one customer to charge the
bank with a conflict of interests.
3. Internal Use of Nonpublic Information Obtainedfrom One Cus-
tomer in a Transaction with Another Customer. Although there is little
doubt that a bank should not disclose confidential information about
one customer to another, the more difficult question is whether a bank
itself may use such information when deciding whether to lend to a
customer other than the one to which the information relates. This
problem most commonly occurs when one customer of a bank proposes
to acquire another of the bank's customers. The federal courts that
have considered this question have not agreed. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit discussed extensively the propriety of a bank's
internal use of confidential information in Washington Steel Corp. v.
TW Corp.40 In dictum, the court declined to adopt the view that a
bank violates a duty to a customer when it uses information received
from that customer in deciding whether to make a loan to another pro-
spective borrower.4 1 The court reached this conclusion for the same
policy reason that led it to dismiss the per se rule against financing
takeovers of customers: the potential restrictions on the availability of
capital.42 The court reasoned that banks would have to act blindly,
perhaps in derogation of their duties to depositors, if they were not
permitted to consider all the information at their disposal before lend-
ing. To avoid this problem, banks might refrain from lending to any
companies that seek to acquire the stock of other bank customers. Be-
cause either alternative impedes "the free flow of funds," the court of
40. 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
41. Id. at 603. The court also stated:
Of course, we intimate no view on whether a bank may be foreclosed from disseminating
confidential information to a separate bank department, such as the trust department,
whose function it is to recommend particular investments to its clients. Such dissemina-
tion of insider information arguably might violate Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 and the S.E.C.'s Rule lOb-5.
Id. (emphasis in original). For a discussion of this problem, see text accompanying notes 63-112
infra.
42. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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appeals declined to hamper internal bank communications.43
Other federal courts, however, do not share the Third Circuit's
view. For example, in American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Co. 44 Judge McMillen strongly implied that a
bank may not use nonpublic information obtained from a customer
when financing a second corporation's attempt to acquire that cus-
tomer.45  Similarly, in Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc. ,46 a
related case, Judge Lasker agreed with Judge McMullen that a fiduciary
or confidential relationship between a bank and its customer precludes
the bank from disseminating or using nonpublic information about the
customer for "improper purposes." 47 The Securities and Exchange
Commission apparently also believes that a bank's internal use of non-
public information received from and concerning its borrower breaches
a common law duty the bank owes to the borrower.48
Senators Proxmire, Sarbanes, and Williams recently questioned
the use of nonpublic information by banks in tender offers. In a letter
to the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 the sen-
ators expressed concern about the potential for banks to exploit confi-
dential information, particularly in tender offer financing. They also
inquired about the coverage of the securities laws in this area, and
solicited the chairman's suggestions for any necessary amendments.50
In response, Chairman Williams wrote, "The Commission believes
that the federal securities laws should expressly regulate the use of in-
43. 602 F.2d at 603.
44. 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ili. 1977) (denying a preliminary injunction).
45. We. . . find that a bank is not precluded under all circumstances from making a
loan to facilitate the attempted takeover of a customer. If it does not rely on the confi-
dential information of its customers in its files, we believe that a bank is free to deal with
any customer who comes to it.
Id. at 8.
46. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286, at 92,823 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
47. Id. at 92,829.
48. In deciding whether to finance a cash tender offer, a bank may be in a position to use
confidential information it previously obtained frm the subject company. As a policy
matter, it can be argued that internal use of the information by a bank is improper since
it gives the bank a competitive advantage by permitting it to base its lending determina-
tion on information which is generally not available to other banks. In addition, the
information, in all likelihood, was provided to the bank by the subject company with a
reasonable expectation that it would be kept confidential and, in any event, that it would
not be used contrary to the interests of the subject company or its management. Thus,
the bank's use of the information could result in a breach of a common law fiduciary
obligation owed by the bank to the subject company.
SEC Memorandum 6 (footnotes omitted).
49. Letter from Senators Proxmire, Sarbanes, and Williams to Harold M. Williams, Chair-
man, Securities and Exchange Commission (July 3, 1979), reprinted in [1980] SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 542 at A-3 (Special Supplement).
50. Id.
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formation in [tender offers], where there is such a close relationship
between the conduct of banks and securities transactions."' 5' In the
memorandum accompanying the Williams letter, the Commission sug-
gested that a bank that uses nonpublic information in deciding whether
to finance a tender offer may violate section 14(e) of the 1934 Act,52
even if it does not violate rule l0b-5. 53 Although the bank's internal
use of information would not satisfy the "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" requirement of rule lOb-5, 54 the deci-
sion to finance a takeover might be "in connection with" a tender offer,
and thus fall under the antifraud provisions of section 14(e). The pro-
spective offeror, in contrast, would not be liable for the bank's strictly
internal use of confidential information." The Commission went on to
make legislative proposals to deal with the use of material nonpublic
information by banks.56
Section 13(d)(1)(B) of the 1934 Act5 7 currently requires disclosure
of the name of the bank financing the offeror only if the loan is not
made in the ordinary course of the bank's business. The Securities and
Exchange Commission has stated that the purpose of the existing provi-
sion is to prevent "a subject company from exerting pressure on the
bank to withhold financing for a tender offer."'58 The Commission's
proposed amendment to section 13(d)(1)(B) would require tender offer-
ors to disclose the name of any bank that lends funds to finance a
tender offer if the bank has had a commercial relationship with the
target company within the past two years.59 The Commission indicated
51. Letter from Harold M. Williams to Senator Proxmire (February 15, 1980), reprinled in
[1980] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 542 at A-3 (Special Supplement).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). See note 33 supra.
53. SEC Memorandum 7.
54. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
55. SEC Memorandum 7.
56. See SEC Memorandum 10 for the legislative proposal to prohibit a bank that finances a
tender offer from disclosing material nonpublic information obtained from the target company.
See note 33 supra.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)(B) (1976).
58. SEC Memorandum 9.
59. The Commission's explanation was as follows:
[T]he Commission recommends that Section 13(d)(l)(B) be amended to require the bid-
der to disclose the name of the lender financing a tender offer or acquisition except
where a source of funds is a loan made in the ordinary course of business by a bank and
no prior or present commercial relationship exists between such bank and the subject
company. As amended, Section 13(d)(1)(B) would require that a bidder disclose:
the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be used in
making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price or proposed purchase
price is represented or is to be represented by funds or other consideration borrowed
or otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading such secur-
ity, a description of the transaction and the names of the parties thereto, except that
where a source of funds is a loan made in the ordinary course of business by a bank,
as defined in Section 3(a)(6) of this title, and, after reasonable inquiry, the person
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that if this proposal is adopted, it will consider amending schedule
14D- 160 to require additional disclosure of the nature and extent of the
commercial relationship between the bank and the target company.
The proposed revisions of section 13(d)(1)(B) and schedule 14D-1
are intended to discourage the financing of a tender offer by a bank
having a commercial relationship with the target company. Requiring
disclosure of the identity of the bank, thus subjecting it to pressure and
possibly to lawsuits, would deter a bank from lending funds to a com-
pany that intends to acquire a customer or former customer. Hence,
the Commission's proposal represents a reversal of the former policy of
not hampering bank financing of tender offers.6'
Until the Security and Exchange Commission's initiative is
adopted or rejected, however, banks should carefully consider what
policies they should follow regarding the financing of tender offers
when the target company is a present or past customer. Two commen-
tators have proposed that a bank disclose in its advertising and promo-
tional literature that its policies do not preclude the financing of
takeovers of its customers, and that in evaluating a loan application it
will consider all information in its possession.62 This proposal has two
obvious drawbacks: it will drive away customers, and it will probably
not accomplish its purpose of implicitly waiving the bank's fiduciary
duty not to misuse nonpublic information.
Even if this proposal could insulate a bank from its fiduciary re-
sponsibility to its customer, it would have no bearing on the Commis-
sion's legislative recommendation. The Commission's proposal aims at
filing the statement does not know or have reason to know that any prior or present
commercial relationship exists between such bank and the issuer of the class of se-
curities to be acquired, the name of the bank shall not be made available to the
public, if the person filing such statement so requests.
SEC Memorandum 10. The Commission suggested that a "prior commercial relationship" could
be defined as a business relationship between a bank and a subject company that existed within
two years prior to the date that the bidder first approached the bank. Id. The Commission con-
sidered and rejected two other proposals. The first would have required the disclosure of the
name of the bank if the bank was in possession of material nonpublic information obtained from
the target company. The second would have required disclosure of the bank's name in all cases.
Id. 9-10.
60. Schedule 14D-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1980), is the disclosure statement that an of-
feror must file on the date of the commencement of its tender offer. The schedule is also used in
certain situations to satisfy the reporting requirements under section 13(d) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78m (1976).
61. See text accompanying note 58 supra. Cf. Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to all member banks (Oct. 23, 1979) (advising
the banks that, in allocating available credit, they should avoid making loans for "extraordinary
financial transactions," such as loans for corporate takeovers).




disclosure of conflicts of interest by banks in particular transactions for
the benefit of target company shareholders. Disclosure of potential
conflicts to corporate customers would not accomplish this goal.
Hence, in light of the confusion in the case law and the position the
Commission has recently taken on this issue, the only clear way a bank
can avoid liability is to decline to finance acquisitions of target compa-
nies about which the bank possesses material nonpublic information.
C. Disclosure of Nonpublic Information by a Bank's Commercial
Department to its Trust Department.
With the growth of trust departments in large commercial banks,
the traditional separation between the institutional lender and the insti-
tutional fiduciary has almost disappeared. In 1970 commercial banks
managed $292 billion as fiduciaries, 63 equal to nearly two-thirds of the
commercial banking assets held by the same banks. The trust depart-
ment is often a bank's largest depositor.64 In the past decade there has
been an increased recognition that the operation of trust and commer-
cial departments by a single bank requires the bank to perform duties
that may conflict, chiefly with respect to the management and use of
material nonpublic information.
1. The Trustee's Duty of Undivided Loyalty, Care, and Skill. A
trustee owes a fundamental common law duty to its beneficiary to ad-
minister the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary65 and with an
ordinary degree of care, skill, and prudence. 66 Federal law has recog-
nized this duty in section 404 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 197467 (ERISA), which governs the duties of trustees of
employee benefit plans.
63. Ehrlich, The Functions and Investment Policies of Personal Trust Departments, 1972
MONTHLY REv. FED. RES. BANK N.Y. 255.
64. Hunsicker, Conflicts of Interest, Economic Distortions and the Separation of Trust and
Commercial.Banking Functions, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 611, 622 (1977). Most trust department depos-
its are of uninvested funds held in demand accounts. Id.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959); cf Albright v. Jefferson County
Nat'l Bank, 292 N.Y. 31, 53 N.E.2d 753 (1944) (a corporate trustee is prohibited from placing itself
in a position where its own interests may conflict with its duties as a trustee).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 174, 227(a) (1959).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976). Section 404 provides that a fiduciary:
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then pre-
vailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
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Institutional trustees must meet a higher standard of professional
skill and care than individual trustees.68 Individual trustees generally
must investigate the safety of and probable income from prospective
investments, and must secure information about such investments from
customary sources. The trust department of a bank, however, must in-
vestigate investments more thoroughly than an individual trustee, using
all the facilities at its disposal.6 9
To satisfy these standards, the past practice of trust departments
was to make investment decisions based on all available information,
including material nonpublic information obtained from the bank's
commercial customers. Soliciting and acquiring material nonpublic in-
formation was considered to be evidence of the care and prudence of
the trustees. Banks developed lines of communication between their
commercial and trust departments to discharge fully this duty they per-
ceived as salutary.70 Banks have recently been made aware, however,
that the single-minded promotion of the interests of trust beneficiaries
may expose them to liability to commercial department customers
under common law principles, and to purchasers and sellers of securi-
ties under the federal securities laws.
2. The Bank's Duty of Confidentiality Under Common Law. A
bank has a duty under common law to maintain in confidence nonpub-
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims ....
The Conference Report on this section states: "Under the conference substitute each fiduciary of
a plan must act solely in the interests of the plan's participants and beneficiaries and exclusively to
provide benefits to these participants and beneficiaries (or to pay reasonable plan administrative
costs)." H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 243, 303 (1974) (Joint Explanatory Statement
of the Committee of Conference), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5083.
The "prudent man" standard incorporated in ERISA is derived from section 174 of the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, which states: "The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in
administering the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exer-
cise in dealing with his own property ....
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227, Comment d (1959).
69. Id. The standard for trustees generally is as follows:
The trustee does not use due care in making an investment unless he makes an investiga-
tion as to the safety of the investment and the probable income to be derived therefrom.
Ordinarily this involves securing information from sources on which prudent men in the
community customarily rely. He may take into consideration advice given to him by
attorneys, bankers, brokers and others whom prudent men in the community regard as
qualified to give advice, but he is not ordinarily justified in relying solely on such advice,
but must exercise his own judgment.
Id., Comment b. Comment d states the more stringent requirement for the corporate trustee:
If the trustee is a bank or trust company, it must use in selecting investments the facilities
which it has or should have, and it may properly be required to show that it has made a
more thorough and complete investigation than would ordinarily be expected from an
individual trustee.
Id., Comment d.
70. See Hunsicker, supra note 64, at 631-32.
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lic information obtained from commercial department customers. This
duty was discussed previously in the context of financing takeovers of a
customer of the bank.71 The statements of the duty in that context,
however, are broad enough to embrace a similar duty of the commer-
cial department not to pass material nonpublic information to the trust
department. 72 Although no cases apply this rule of confidentiality to
trading by a bank's trust department, the court of appeals' decision in
Schein v. Chasen73 presents an analogous situation. In that case a cor-
porate officer tipped an employee of Lehman Brothers that the corpo-
ration would not achieve the earnings previously projected. The
Lehman Brothers employee passed this information on to some of his
institutional customers, who sold large blocks of the corporation's stock
before the revised earnings projections were publicly disclosed.
In a shareholders' derivative action, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the corporation had a common law cause of
action against both the corporate officer and the tippees for the profits
the tippees derived from using the information. The court ruled that
the duty of confidentiality falls not only on "technical fiduciaries," but
also on those who become fiduciaries by acquiring confidential infor-
mation from a fiduciary.74  The tippees were thus "automatically
clothed with a duty to [the corporation] not to use the information for
their own selfish advantages."75 Hence, the Schein decision suggests
that liability may be imposed on a bank whose trust department trades
on confidential information obtained from a customer by the commer-
cial department.
3. The Bank's Duty of Confidentiality under the Federal Securities
Laws. A bank possessing material nonpublic information about a pub-
licly held commercial department customer may have a responsibility
71. See text accompanying notes 17-39 supra.
72. While the link between the use of nonpublic information and the harm to the commercial
department customer in the context of ordinary market transactions by the trust department may
not be as clear as in acquisition situations, there are nonetheless certain instances in which the
harm can be great. For example, trading on adverse nonpublic information by a bank trust de-
partment could result in a severe decline in the price of a company's stock before the company has
had an opportunity to make an orderly and complete disclosure of the adverse development.
In Thomas v. Roblin Indus., 520 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975), the court stated that as a matter of
common law, a fiduciary of a corporation who trades for his own benefit on the basis of nonpublic
information breaches a duty to the corporation regardless of whether the corporation suffers dam-
age as a result of his trading. Id. at 1397; see Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d
910 (1969) (enunciating the same rule under New York Law).
73. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein,
416 U.S. 386 (1974).
74. 478 F.2d at 823.
75. Id.
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under the federal securities laws to prevent its trust department from
trading on the basis of such information. Before the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Chiarella v. United States,76 one who traded on mate-
rial nonpublic information without disclosure clearly violated rule lOb-
5 and was liable to defrauded purchasers or sellers.77 The rule applied
both to corporate insiders78 and to their tippees.79 This rule, sometimes
referred to as the "disclose or abstain from trading" rule, was most
clearly stated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.80 The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur held that
insiders with access to information that is intended for a corporate pur-
pose may not publicly trade on it knowing that the public lacks access
to the inside information.8' But the court then stated that
the Rule is also applicable to one possessing the information who
may not be strictly termed an "insider" within the meaning of Sec.
16(b) of the Act. . . . Thus, anyone in possession of material inside
information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is
disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence,
or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recom-
mending the securities concerned while such inside information re-
mains undisclosed.82
The Texas GulfSulphur decision suggested that anyone who trades on
material nonpublic information without disclosure violates rule lOb-5.
The Second Circuit narrowed this suggestion in SEC v. Monarch
Fund.8 3 In that case, two investment partnerships traded on nonpublic
information that a company was about to complete a major private
placement of its convertible debentures. The partnerships' advisor had
learned of the private placement "from several sources" and had veri-
76. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
77. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) and 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v.
Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Investors Management Co., Sec. Ex-
change Act Release No. 9267, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,163
(1971); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 8459, [1967-
1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,629 (1968); Cady, Roberts & Co., Sec. Ex-
change Act Release No. 6668, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,803
(1961).
78. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 6668, [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,803 (1961).
79. See, e.g., SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
80. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) and 404 U.S. 1005
(1971).
81. 401 F.2d at 848.
82. Id.
83. 608 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1979).
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fled it in a conversation with a director of the company.8 4 The district
court held that the defendants violated rule lOb-5 because the partner-
ships had traded on information that the advisor knew or had reason to
know was not public and that had been obtained "improperly by selec-
tive revelation or otherwise. ' s5
The court of appeals reversed.86 It distinguished true insiders,
such as officers, directors, and employees of a company, from outsiders
who may have obtained nonpublic information.8 7 The court stated that
insiders have a degree of knowledge that makes them culpable if they
trade on nonpublic information.88 The court was unwilling to make
this assumption for outsiders, choosing instead to determine their cul-
pability by whether they had reason to know they were trading on non-
public information. 9 The court found that the Monarch Fund
defendants were not liable, because the record did not indicate whether
the advisor had reason to know that his contacts acted improperly in
giving him information about the private placement. 90
In Chiarella v. United States91 the Supreme Court specifically re-
pudiated the broad rule suggested by Texas WulfSulphur. The Court
held that rule lOb-5's prohibition against trading on nonpublic infor-
mation extends only to "traditional corporate insiders"-directors, of-
ficers, and controlling shareholders-and to those who owe a duty to
disclose such information to the prospective seller or purchaser of the
securities. 92
Although Chiarella clearly limits the scope of 1Ob-5 liability for
trading on nonpublic information, 93 the implications of that decision
84. Id. at 940.
85. Id. at 940-41.
86. Id. at 944.
87. Id. at 941-42.
88. Id. at 941.
89. Id. at 942.
90. Id.
91. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
92. Id. at 227-33. See also General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
93. The Securities and Exchange Commission contends that the scope of the holding in
Chiarella is not so clear. In its release accompanying the promulgation of rule 14e-3, 45 Fed. Reg.
60,410 (1980), the Commission states that the Supreme Court did not decide whether a person
violates rule lOb-5 by trading while in possession of material nonpublic information obtained by
unlawful means. Id. 60,411. As an alternate theory of liability, the Commission had argued in
Chiarella that such trading violated rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court, however, refused to consider
this theory because it had not been submitted to the jury in the district court. 445 U.S. at 236.
Hence, the Commission noted in its release that "in view of the limited holding in Chiarella, the
Commission continues to believe" that trading while in possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion "misappropriated or obtained or used by unlawful means" violates rule 1Ob-5. 45 Fed. Reg.
at 60,412 & n.20.
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for a trust department's securities transactions are unclear. After
Chiarella there remain three theories on which a bank whose trust de-
partment trades on nonpublic information may be liable under rule
lOb-5: first, the bank's receipt of nonpublic information as a tippee-
for example, as a result of a breach of fiduciary duty by a traditional
corporate insider such as an executive officer, a director, or a principal
shareholder;94 second, the bank's status as a corporate insider;95 and
third, the bank's fiduciary duty to a particular person or class of per-
sons with whom it traded.96
It is conceivable, however, that under Chiarella a bank's trust de-
partment could trade on material nonpublic information that it re-
ceived in the ordinary course of a commercial lending relationship
without violating rule lOb-5. In that situation, the bank would not be a
tippee, for it would have obtained the nonpublic information lawfully
and not by virtue of a corporate insider's breach of fiduciary duty. If a
bank does not become an insider by reason of its lending relationship
with a company, the only way a bank could incur rule lOb-5 liability
under the Chiarella analysis is if some other basis exists to establish a
fiduiciary relationship between the bank and the borrower's sharehold-
ers.
97
While it is correct that the Court in Chiarella did not rule on the alternate theory put forth by
the Commission, it is somewhat misleading to suggest that the Court's decision did not cast serious
doubt on this theory. In Chiarella the Court focused on the absence of a relationship between the
parties to the transaction and rejected several theories that would have found the defendant liable
because he traded on the material nonpublic information. The Commission's alternate theory
looks to how the information was obtained rather than the identity of the user. This theory is
much closer to the arguments that the Supreme Court rejected than it is to the theory of liability
under rule lOb-5 that the Supreme Court adopted.
The Commission also states that, in its view, the decision in Chiarella did not suggest any
limitation on its authority under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act to adopt a rule regarding trading
while in possession of material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer. Id. 60,411. See
note 38 supra for a discussion of the authority of the Commission to adopt rule 14e-3.
94. When a bank receives nonpublic information in the normal course of a commercial lend-
ing relationship, the disclosure of such information to the bank would not, absent extraordinary
circumstances, be in breach of the insider's fiduciary duty to his corporation, and thus a bank
should not incur tippee liability.
95. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
96. This duty could result from some special relationship of the bank to the other party to a
transaction. For example, if the bank or one of its affiliates bought or sold securities from an
individual for whom the bank was acting as trustee, the bank would almost certainly have a
fiduciary duty to disclose.
97. The Court in Chiarella took note of the fact that the nonpublic information obtained by
the defendant was "market information," which "did not concern the earning power or operations
of the target company, but only the plans of the acquiring company." 445 U.S. at 231. Moreover,
the sources of this information were not the target companies, but the companies about to make
tender offers. Although the holding in Chiarella is not limited to cases involving market informa-
tion, lower courts seeking to restrict the case might apply it only to market information. In addi-
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Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,9" which the Chiarella Court
discussed at length, may shed some light on the Supreme Court's think-
ing on this question. In Affiliated Ute Citizens a group of American
Indians formed a corporation to manage tribal assets.99 The corpora-
tion appointed a bank as its transfer agent't° and instructed it to dis-
courage sales of the company's stock because of the difficulty of valuing
the shares.10 ' Two bank employees helped the shareholders sell their
stock.'0 2 Later, these shareholders sued, claiming that the bank em-
ployees and the bank violated rule lOb-5' 03 when the employees failed
to inform the selling shareholders of material information relating to
the value of their shares. t04
The Supreme Court recognized that the bank would have had no
duty of disclosure if it had been merely a transfer agent. 105 The Court
indicated in Chiarella, however, that it had found the bank liable in
Affiliated Ute Citizens because, by agreeing to discourage sales of the
company's stock, the bank "also had assumed a duty to act on behalf of
the shareholders, and the Indian sellers had relied upon its personnel
when they sold their stock."' 0 6
One might conclude that by relying on Affiliated Ute Citizens, the
Court in Chiarella intended to limit the fiduciary duties that require
disclosure under rule 1Ob-5 to those duties specifically assumed in con-
nection with purchases or sales of securities. 0 7 If this conclusion is
tion, subsequent cases may create additional duties of disclosure based on relationships not
explored in the Chiarella opinion.
In Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980), decided soon after the
Chiarella decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the securities firm of
Morgan Stanley & Co. did not become a fiduciary of Olinkraft Corporation merely because Olin-
kraft, which was the subject of a possible acquisition, provided Morgan Stanley with confidential
information while Morgan Stanley was acting as an advisor to another corporation that was look-
ing for acquisition possibilities.
98. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
99. Id. at 136.
100. Id. at 136-37.
101. Id. at 146.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 140.
104. The plaintiffs joined the United States as a defendant, alleging that the United States had
a duty to prevent the sale of the stock under fraudulent circumstances and therefore was liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976). 406 U.S. at 140.
105. 406 U.S. at 151-52.
106. 445 U.S. at 230.
107. The Securities and Exchange Commission, in its release accompanying the adoption of
rule 14e-3, reached a similar conclusion regarding the meaning of the Supreme Court's reliance on
A.ffliated Ute Citizen.r
The Court also affirmed its holding in Affliated Ue Citizens x United States that a
fiduciary may not trade with its beneficiary while in possession of material information
of which the beneficiary is not aware. Thus, persons who possess such information and
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correct, the vast majority of securities transactions that bank trust de-
partments engage in are exempt from liability under rule lOb-5 for
nondisclosure, because banks rarely assume the kinds of duties that
would trigger the duty to disclose.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has attempted to avoid
the implications of Chiarella for tender offer trading by adopting rule
14e-3(a). 0 8 The purpose of the rule is to create a duty of disclosure
under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act whether or not there is any fiduci-
ary relationship between the purchaser and seller of securities. Hence,
had the Court decided Chiarela under rule 14e-3(a), rather than rule
lOb-5, the defendant's trading would have violated the securities laws.
Were it not for an exception, rule 14e-3(a) would have a harmful
effect on banks and other financial institutions. For example, if a
tender offeror persuades the commercial department of a bank to
finance a tender offer and gives the bank material nonpublic informa-
tion about the offer, the bank violates the rule if its trust department
innocently purchases or sells securities of the target company before the
information is made public. To avoid this result, rule 14e-3(b) was ad-
ded as an exception to rule 14e-3(a).10 9 The exception exempts an insti-
in whom a purchaser or seller has reasonably reposed trust and confidence with respect
to securities transactions are subject to a duty to disclose that information or to abstain
from trading with such purchaser or seller.
45 Fed. Reg. at 60,412 (footnotes and citations omitted).
108. See notes 34-35 supra. The rule prohibits trading without disclosure in securities that are
the subject of a tender offer by a person, other than the offeror, who has information about the
offer that he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and has been acquired directly or indi-
rectly from the offeror, the target, or any officer, director, partner, employee, or advisor of either.
The rule applies whenever either a tender offer has commenced or a substantial step has been
taken to commence a tender offer. The Commission states that this standard "is not totally objec-
tive." 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,413 n.33. In the release accompanying the adoption of the rule, the
Commission gives the following examples of substantial steps to commence a tender offer. voting
on a resolution by the offeror's board relating to the offer, formulating a plan to make a tender
offer, arranging financing; preparing or authorizing tender offer materials; and obtaining a solicit-
ing dealer, forwarding agent, or depository. Id. All of these examples involve acts which are
unlikely to be known by outsiders, and it is not required that a person actually know that a
substantial step to commence a tender offer has been taken for him to violate the rule. Thus, rule
14e-3(a) undoubtedly will prevent trading without disclosure any time a person subject to the rule
has material nonpublic information about a tender offer that he has reason to believe emanated
from one of the sources listed in the rule.
Purchases of a security which is the subject of the offer by a broker or other agent on behalf of
the offering person, and sales of such a security to the offering person, do not violate the rule.
Rule 14e-3(c), 45 Fed. Reg. 60,418 (1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(c)).
109. Rule 14e-3(b) states:
(b) A person other than a natural person shall not violate paragraph (a) of this
section if such person shows that:
(1) The individual(s) making the investment decision on behalf of such person to
purchase or sell any security described in paragraph (a) of this section or to cause any




tution from liability under rule 14e-3(a) if it can meet two
requirements. First, the institution must prove that the persons who
bought or sold the securities for the institution did not know the non-
public information when they made the investment decision. Second,
the institution must show that it has adopted reasonable procedures to
prevent the violation of the first requirement. to The procedures "may
include, but are not limited to" lists that restrict the purchase or sale of
the security (restricted lists) or methods that prevent the investment de-
cision-maker from knowing the nonpublic information (Chinese
Walls).' '
The adoption of rule 14e-3 creates an anomaly under the federal
securities laws. Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, the antifraud provision
that specifically applies to tender offers, now incorporates a "disclose or
abstain from trading" rule. Section 10(b) of the Act and rule lOb-5, the
antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act that apply generally to purchases
and sales of securities, require disclosure only when the relationship
between parties to the transaction creates an obligation to disclose t 12
Hence, the Securities and Exchange Commission has imposed a more
stringent rule on tender offer trading than exists for securities trading
generally.
4. AftemptedReconciliation of a Bank's Conflicting Duties. As dis-
cussed above, banks may find that their duties to trust department cus-
tomers conflict with their obligations under common law and federal
securities law not to use nonpublic information. Some authorities have
attempted to resolve these conflicts through the traditional trust law
doctrine that a trustee may not commit acts in furtherance of the trust
(2) Such person had implemented one or a combination of policies and procedures,
reasonable under the circumstances, taking into consideration the nature of the person's
business, to ensure that individual(s) making investment decision(s) would not violate
paragraph (a) of this section, which policies and procedures may include, but are not
limited to, (i) those which restrict any purchase, sale and causing [sic] any purchase and
sale of any such security or (ii) those which prevent such individual(s) from knowing
such information.
45 Fed. Reg. 60,418 (1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b)).
110. The institution has the burden of proof for both elements of the exception. 45 Fed. Reg.
at 60,415. In the release accompanying the adoption of rule 14e-3, the Commission states that a
person attempting to establish the "non-availability" of the exception in rule 14e-3(b) "may be
able after the institution has met the initial burden to show circumstances under which it would
not be reasonable that the individual decision maker(s) did not know the information." Id. 60,415
n.43. The Commission then states that this evidence may also bear on the effectiveness of the
policies and procedures in the second element of the exception. Id. Of course, the Commission
misspoke when it referred to a person attempting to establish the non-availability of the exception,
because the institution has the burden of proving that the exception is available to it. Id. 60,415.
111. The procedures adopted must be "reasonable under the circumstances." Id.
112. See Koeltl & Kubek, supra note 38, at 906.
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that are illegal or against public policy."13 These authorities argue that
a bank that does not use nonpublic information because of potential
liability under common law or federal securities laws should not incur
liability to its trust department customers for a breach of the bank's
duty of care and skill."t 4
This argument forms the basis of the "Chinese Wall" concept. Yet
there are at least two reasons to doubt the soundness of the argument.
First, there are certain uses of nonpublic information on behalf of trust
beneficiaries for which a bank is not liable under either the federal se-
curities laws or common law. For example, the use of nonpublic infor-
mation in a decision not to sell or not to buy a security does not violate
the federal antifraud provisions. Only decisions in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security violate these provisions." 5 Furthermore,
while there appear to be no decisions on point, it is almost certain that
no common law duty is violated by such use of nonpublic information.
The reasons given by the Supreme Court for limiting federal antifraud
damage actions to purchasers or sellers of securities would also apply to
common law actions. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores l6 the
Supreme Court retained the limitation because of a fear that to abolish
it would stimulate a flood of baseless lawsuits.1 7 For similar reasons it
is unlikely that any court would fashion a common law remedy for
those who neither purchased nor sold securities but who merely allege
113. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (a trust held unen-
forceable as violative of statutes or public policy); Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261,
135 A. 555 (1926) (provisions of a trust held invalid on public policy grounds); Bauer v. Bates
Lumber Co., 84 N.M. 391, 503 P.2d 1169 (Ct. App. 1972) (provisions of a trust held invalid be-
cause they violated a statute); ABA Committee Comment, Problems of Fiduciaries Under the Se-
curities Laws, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 292, 303 (1974). For an example of an express
statutory prohibition, see IND. CODE § 30-4-2-12 (1971): "The terms of the trust may not require
the trustee to commit a criminal or tortious act or an act which is contrary to public policy." See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 62, 166 (1959); A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§§ 61, 166 (3d ed. 1967).
114. This position apparently derives from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 166
(1959).
115. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (reaffirming the doc-
trine that to maintain a private cause of action for damages under rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must
have been a purchaser or seller of securities). Similarly, a violation of the Commission's newly
adopted rule 14e-3(a) occurs only if there has been a purchase or sale of a security. See 45 Fed.
Reg. at 60,413.
116. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
117. The Blue Chp Stamps Court gave two reasons for retaining the purchaser-seller require-
ment under rule lOb-5. First, the requirement conveniently separates the plaintiff whose version
of the facts is more likely to be believed by the trier of fact because he actually purchased or sold
securities, from the much larger group of potential plaintiffs whose versions of the facts are much
less likely to be believed because their only action was not to buy or sell. Id. at 743. Second, to
abolish the purchaser-seller requirement would require the trier of fact to decide many hazy issues
of fact almost entirely on oral testimony. Id.
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that because of the defendant's fraud they did not buy or sell and
thereby suffered damages.
A second reason for doubting the validity of the argument based
on traditional trust law doctrine is that several cases have suggested
that a fiduciary, faced with conflicting legal duties, cannot resolve the
conflict by choosing between them to the disadvantage of one of the
parties to whom it owes a duty. In Black v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co.,118 for example, a securities firm recommended the purchase of
certain securities to its retail customers without divulging adverse non-
public information in its possession. One of the members of the securi-
ties firm was also a director of the corporation that issued the securities.
When the customers sued the firm for fraud, the firm defended by argu-
ing that the firm member's connection with the corporation created a
fiduciary obligation not to disclose the adverse information." 9 The
court rejected that defense, stating that a person may not evade one
fiduciary duty by voluntarily assuming a conflicting duty. t20 Rather
than failing to perform one duty in order to fulfill the other, the court
stated, the fiduciary should avoid taking on conflicting duties or should
end one relationship when the conflict develops. 121
In Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. 122 the defendants made a
similar argument. Retail customers of Shearson, Hammill alleged that
the firm had violated the federal securities laws when its retail division
recommended the purchase of a security while its corporate finance di-
vision had material, adverse, nonpublic information about the issuer.
Shearson, Hammill argued that it was legally prohibited from disclos-
ing such information to its retail customers until the information be-
came public. The district court disposed of that contention by noting
that the firm had voluntarily assumed the two conflicting duties, neither
of which had priority over the other. If fulfilling both duties produced
a commercial loss, the loss was Shearson, Hammill's to bear. t23
118. 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968).
119. Id. at 367-68, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
120. Id. at 368, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
121. Id.
122. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,329 (S.D.N.Y.) (denial of
motion for summary judgment), question certified, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,439 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), remandedas certlFcation impro vidently granted, 517 F.2d 398 (2d
Cir. 1974), settled, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,473 (S.D.N.Y.) (the court
approved the private monetary settlement between shareholder plaintiffs and securities firm).
123. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,329. The subsequent history
of the case, see note 122 supra, which involved certification of a question to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, a remand by the Second Circuit to the district court, and, finally, a settle-
ment of the case, has rendered doubtful the precedential value of the district court's decision. A
similar issue was presented in Cady, Roberts & Co., Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 6668, [1961-
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The principle that a person who serves two interests in a fiduciary
capacity cannot favor one over the other' 24 renders highly suspect the
claim that the Chinese Wall reconciles the bank's conflicting duties.
Hence, despite the outpouring of commentary on the Chinese Wall as a
resolution of the conffict problems of banks and securities firms,125 the
efficacy of the wall for that purpose is far from clear. 26
II. Is THE CHINESE WALL A SOLUTION?
The Chinese Wall concept originated in the settlement of a Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission proceeding against Merrill Lynch. 127
Merrill Lynch had been the managing underwriter of an offering of
Douglas Aircraft securities. Douglas Aircraft confidentially informed
Merrill Lynch that it anticipated a drop in earnings. Brokers at Merrill
1964 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,803. A party to the proceeding, Gintel,
contended that the Securities and Exchange Commission should not discipline him for making
sales from his customers' discretionary accounts based on material nonpublic information that
was adverse to the issuer. Gintel claimed he owed a fiduciary duty to his customers that required
him to sell the issuer's shares after he learned of the adverse information. The Commission re-
jected this position on the ground that the duty not to trade on inside information is primary. The
Commission disagreed with Gintel's argument that the Commission's decision in Val Alstyne,
Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311 (1952), supported Gintel's position. In that proceeding, a broker-dealer
who sold securities to customers without revealing material adverse information in its possession
about the issuer, contended that it received the adverse information in confidence and therefore
could not disclose it. The Commission rejected the defense and found that the broker-dealer had
violated the federal antifraud provisions.
124. See Local 734 v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,565 (N.D. Ill. 1974), vacated on rehearing sub nom. O'Brien v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 431 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill. 1977), rev'd in part and affidin
part, 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979). The plaintiffs, who were beneficiaries of trusts for which the
defendant bank was either trustee or agent, contended that the bank in its capacity as a commer-
cial lender obtained "inside information" about certain corporations indicating that investment in
their securities was unwise. The plaintiffs claimed that the purchases and retention for the trusts
of securities issued by these corporations breached the bank's fiduciary duty as trustee. Neither
the district court nor the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dealt with the issue directly.
125. See, e.g., Herzel & Coiling, The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus.
LAW. 73 (1978); Huck, The Fatal Lure of the "Impermeable Chinese Wall," 94 BANKING L. J. 100
(1977); Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50
N.Y.U. L. REv. 459 (1975); Chazen, Reinforcing the Chinese Wall- A Response, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV.
552 (1976); Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall- A Reply to Chazen, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 579 (1976);
Mendez-Penate, supra note 18.
Certain law firms have contended that they could establish Chinese Walls to eliminate their
own conflict situations. In every case in which this issue has been raised, the courts have ruled
against the law firms. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Fund of
Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
126. "As a legal and practical matter the effectiveness of Chinese Walls in dealing with con-
flict situations is unclear." SEC Memorandum 8 n.18.
127. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 8459, [1967-
1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,629 (1968).
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Lynch then relayed the nonpublic information concerning the expected
drop to selected customers who in turn traded on the private tip. The
Securities and Exchange Commission proceeded against Merrill Lynch
and certain of its employees for violating the securities laws.
In accepting Merrill Lynch's offer of settlement, the Securities and
Exchange Commission took special note of Merrill Lynch's plan to
protect against the disclosure of confidential information in the future.
The Commission singled out Merrill Lynch's new procedures for
preventing dissemination of confidential information by the underwrit-
ing department to other branches of the firm. 128 Although neither Mer-
rill Lynch nor the Commission so named it, the practice of keeping
confidential information within one division of a firm has come to be
known as the Chinese Wall.129
Since the Merrill Lynch settlement in 1969 there has been surpris-
ingly little mention of the Chinese Wall by courts or the Commission.
Only the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Slade v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co. ,130 has explored the legal implications of the Chinese
Wall in any depth. The Second Circuit did not take a position in the
Chinese Wall debate; it remanded the case to the district court to de-
velop a more complete factual record.' 3' The court of appeals did,
however, describe the positions of the parties and amici on the idea of
the Chinese Wall. Shearson, Hammill argued that the federal securi-
ties laws precluded it from using inside information for the benefit of
its customers. To prevent the passing of information from one depart-
ment to another, the brokerage firm therefore recommended placing a
Chinese Wall between the retail and corporate finance departments. 32
The plaintiffs, rather than challenging the concept of the Chinese Wall,
attacked Shearson, Hammill's assertion that the securities laws prevent
a broker from ending a selling campaign once it has received adverse
inside information concerning the issuer. To view the prohibition on
the use of inside information as requiring a broker to sell securities
despite the possession of adverse information would, the plaintiffs ar-
128. Id. at 83,350. The term "Chinese Wall" is not used in the Merrill Lynch release. It is
clear that the Securities and Exchange Commission did not give its unqualified approval to this
procedure as a general cure-all. The Commission stated: "As a matter of Commission policy, we
do not, and indeed cannot, determine in advance that the Statement of Policy will prove adequate
in all circumstances that may arise. Stringent measures will be required in order to avoid future
violations." Id.
129. See, e.g., Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securi-
ties Firns, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 459, 462 (1975).
130. 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
131. Id. at 403.
132. Id. at 402-03.
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gued, turn the inside-information rule on its head and license a fraud
on the public. 33
The Securities and Exchange Commission, in its amicus brief, ac-
knowledged both that inside information should not lead to market
profit, and that brokers should deal fairly with their customers. To har-
monize these two principles, the Commission advocated a reinforced
Chinese Wall: a ban on transmission of inside information between
departments, strengthened with a list of companies whose securities the
firm could not recommend because of an existing investment banking
relationship. 34 The amicus brief of the Salomon Brothers securities
firm echoed the Commission's position on restricted lists. 35 A second
securities firm disagreed, however; Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc. contended that the use of the wall reinforced with restricted lists
conflicts with one of the key functions of an underwriter: to sponsor
new securities issues in the market.136
This diversity of views demonstrates that even advocates of the
Chinese Wall disagree about how to construct it. At least four varia-
tions have been suggested: the solid or impermeable wall, the permea-
ble wall, the reinforced wall, and the administered wall.
The solid or impermeable wal' 137 consists of procedures to prevent
the flow of nonpublic information from the bank's commercial depart-
ment to its trust department. These procedures include: (1) circulating
to commercial and trust department employees a statement that ex-
plains the firm's policies of prohibiting both the trading on nonpublic
information and the communication of such information to the trust
department, and that sets forth procedures for dealing with leaks; (2)
instructing the bank's employees on the problem of insider trading; (3)
restricting access to the commercial department's credit files by trust
department employees with investment responsibilities; (4) disclosing
the existence of the wall to trust department customers; (5) prohibiting
frequent transfers of employees between the trust department and other
departments; (6) forbidding trust department employees from sitting on
committees that discuss credit matters; and (7) physically separating the
trust department from the other departments of the bank. 138




137. A detailed description of an impermeable Chinese Wall for a bank can be found in
Herzel & Coiling, supra note 125, at 88-91. See generally Chazen, supra note 125; Mendez-Penate,
supra note 18.
138. Herzel & Coiling, supra note 125, at 88-91.
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The permeable Chinese Wall is less restrictive than the impermea-
ble wall; it prevents the flow of material, rather than all, nonpublic in-
formation from the commercial to the trust department. 39 Apparently,
a bank desiring to establish such a wall forms a screening mechanism
that attempts to distinguish material from nonmaterial information.
No attempt is made, however, to evaluate what uses of the information
the trust department might properly make.
The reinforced Chinese Wall concept derives from the Securities
and Exchange Commission's and Salomon Brothers' proposals for
securities firms in Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. 140 The reinforced
wall consists of an impermeable wall fortified with a list of securities
that the firm may not recommend to retail customers.' 4' The list is
composed of securities of companies with which the securities firm has
an investment banking relationship. Presumably, a restricted list for a
bank trust department would include securities of companies with
which the bank has a commercial lending relationship. Instead of
prohibiting the making of recommendations to buy or sell, a reinforced
Chinese Wall for a bank would prohibit trading in securities on the
restricted list.
Finally, the administered Chinese Wall is a permeable wall with
formal procedures, including the use of a committee of senior bank
officers, established to control the flow of information from the com-
mercial to the trust department. 142 Rather than focusing on the elusive
distinction between material and nonmaterial information, as does the
permeable wall, the administered wall determines how the bank should
handle nonpublic information in its possession. It prevents the em-
ployees in the trust department from misusing material nonpublic in-
formation but makes this information available to the trust department
for proper uses.
139. Mendez-Penate, supra note 18, at 686.
140. 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
141. For a detailed discussion of this proposal and a discussion of the various positions taken
in the Slade case, see Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution, upra note 125, at 482-90.
142. See Huck, supra note 125, at 114-23. An administered Chinese Wall makes a representa-
tive of the trust department responsible for providing current lists of actual and prospective invest-
ments of the department to a representative of the commercial department. The commercial
department then determines whether it possesses material nonpublic information about any of the
issuers of securities on the lists. If the commercial department representative discovers any such
information, he refers it to a committee of commercial and trust department officers that may halt
trust department trading of securities about which the bank has material nonpublic information.
The administered wall is, therefore, a flexible version of the reinforced wall. In effect, it uses
nonpublic information in decisions not to purchase or sell by stopping all trading in securities
about which the bank has material nonpublic information.
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The administered wall has several advantages over the other ver-
sions of the Chinese Wall. The impermeable wall inflexibly blocks all
communication between the commercial and trust departments. It
therefore interferes with the trust department's fiduciary duty to use
nonpublic information in deciding not to sell or not to buy a security
for a trust beneficiary. 143 The permeable wall is impractical because it
permits trust officers to receive "nonmaterial" nonpublic information
in the bank's possession. It places an enormous, perhaps impossible,
burden on the bank officials to distinguish between what is and what is
not material. 144 The reinforced wall is an inflexible mechanism that
greatly reduces a trust department's investment options by restricting
all trading in securities of issuers with which the bank has a commer-
cial banking relationship. 45
The administered wall, however, enables a group of experienced
bank officers to review all the nonpublic information in the bank's pos-
session and decide on an appropriate course of action, which might
include an order not to sell or purchase particular securities. It has the
advantage of restricting only those securities about which the bank pos-
sesses material nonpublic information.
For these reasons, of the various proposed forms of Chinese Walls,
only the administered wall is an acceptable alternative for a bank.
Prior to the adoption of rule 14e-3 by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 46 a bank could have dispensed with a Chinese Wall and
simply prohibited all trading on the basis of nonpublic information ob-
tained by any other department of the bank. Under such a system, an
investment committee of the trust department would identify informa-
tion that falls within the prescribed category and decide, with the ad-
vice of counsel, whether knowledge of this information requires the
bank to cease trading in a particular company's securities.
143. Herzel & Coiling, supra note 125, at 85-86. See note 124 supra for a discussion of Local
734 v.Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,565 (N.D. IUl. 1974), vacated on rehearing sub nom. O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 431 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. I1. 1977), rev'dinpartandaj'dinpart, 593 F.2d 54(7th
Cir. 1979). Those who recommend an impermeable wall apparently believe that every use by the
trust department of material nonpublic information obtained from the commercial department
violates the law. But no case has held that the use of nonpublic information in deciding not to sell
or buy a security violates the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. Moreover, if Chiarefla v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), is interpreted to permit a bank to trade on nonpublic informa-
tion in certain circumstances, one of the principal justifications for the impermeable wall would be
seriously weakened.
144. See note 8 supra for discussion of the difficulty of distinguishing material information
from nonmaterial information.
145. See Herzel & Coiling, supra note 125, at 82-83; Hunsicker, supra note 64, at 639-40.
146. See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
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Although the Securities and Exchange Commission recently ques-
tioned the effectiveness of Chinese Walls in dealing with conflict situa-
tions, 147 the Commission has virtually required banks to adopt Chinese
Wall-type procedures to avoid liability under rule 14e-3.148 To qualify
for the rule 14e-3(b) exception from liability, an institution must show
that it has adopted one or a combination of procedures to ensure that
those making investment decisions for the institution do not violate
rule 14e-3. Although the Commission emphasizes that it does not re-
quire any particular procedures, 49 there are only two acceptable proce-
dures specified in the rule: restricted lists and Chinese Walls. 50 The
release accompanying the adoption of rule 14e-3 does not shed light on
what other procedures, if any, may be acceptable.' 5'
In light of the serious potential for liability under rule 14e-3, the
only prudent course of action for a bank is to adopt a restricted list or a
Chinese Wall that satisfies rule 14e-3(b).' 52 Restricted list procedures,
however, that prohibit trading in securities of issuers with which the
147. See note 126 supra.
148. See text accompanying notes 110-111 supra. In addition, the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency has promulgated a regulation requiring every national bank exercising fiduciary powers to
adopt written policies and procedures to ensure that the federal securities laws are complied with
in connection with any decision or recommendation to purchase or sell a security. 12 C.F.R.
§ 9.7(d) (1980).
149. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,416. The Commission states that its position on procedures is consis-
tent with that of the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. 60,416 n.47.
See note 148 supra for a discussion of the regulation issued by the Comptroller and note 152 infra
for a discussion of the policy statement of the Board on the misuse of nonpublic information.
While the Comptroller took a truly neutral position on the procedures to be adopted by banks, the
Federal Reserve Board strongly suggested the use of Chinese Walls.
150. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,415.
151. The release refers to "other informal procedures that some institutions employ when they
receive non-public information," mentioning specifically "watch lists," but later in the release a
watch list is described merely as a procedure to monitor trading activity to determine whether
there are any leaks in the Chinese Wall. Id
152. There may be reasons other than rule 14e-3(b) for a bank to adopt a Chinese Wall. In a
policy statement issued in 1978, the Federal Reserve Board stated that it will view the use of
material inside information in connection with any decision or recommendation to purchase or
sell securities as an unsafe and unsound banking practice. The Board stated that it expects each
state member bank that exercises investment discretion for the accounts of others to adopt written
policies and procedures, suitable to its particular circumstances, to ensure that such information in
its possession is not misused. The Board declined to mandate the specific content of policies and
procedures to be adopted, but stated that in general they should limit those activities that are
likely to give rise to an improper interchange of material inside information and should establish a
course of action for the bank to deal with such information that may come into the possession of
personnel engaged in investment decision-making for the accounts of others. The Board provided
examples of what it referred to as "specific approaches to dealing with inside information that
state member banks may wish to consider in the development of policies and procedures for their
own use." These suggested approaches amount to the creation of a Chinese Wall. Federal Re-
serve System, Policy Statement Concerning Use of Inside Information, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,755,
12,756 (1978). See also INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, supra note 8, at 2539.
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bank has a lending relationship cannot be adopted, for they unduly
narrow a bank's investment options. Thus, a bank trading in such se-
curities would be forced to adopt some form of the Chinese Wall.
Even if a bank establishes a Chinese Wall under the pressure of
rule 14e-3, it will not be free from claims of liability for breach of
fiduciary duty by the beneficiaries of its trusts. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission, recognizing this problem, stated that "depending
on the circumstances, it may be appropriate [for a bank] to advise cus-
tomers of its use of the Chinese Wall, because the institution would not
be using all information that it had received to the benefit of a particu-
lar customer." 153 That a bank can obtain an implicit waiver of a fiduci-
ary duty it owes to its trust beneficiaries by simply disclosing its
intention not to fulfill completely its responsibilities is, at best, a doubt-
ful proposition.
To minimize conflicts of interests, the administered wall is the best
of the Chinese Wall alternatives available to a bank, but it is not a
perfect solution. The procedures of the administered wall are complex
and may significantly burden the bank officers who are responsible for
them, and its utility will not be fully established until it withstands
challenge under rule 14e-3(d). Nevertheless, the administered wall has
the significant advantage of preventing a bank's trust department from
purchasing or selling a security when the bank has information that
could indicate that the purchase or sale would be unwise.
III. AIDER-AND-ABETTOR LIABILITY
The management of nonpublic information is only one of the
problems a bank faces in dealing with public companies. As banks
participate in their customers' business transactions, they may be liable
as aiders and abettors of securities law violations that the customers
commit. If the bank plays a routine role in a transaction-for example,
paying checks drawn on the corporate account, or acting as transfer
agent-the bank in all likelihood will not be liable as an aider and
abettor. 5 4 The crucial issue is the extent of the bank's knowledge of its
borrower's illegal activities.'5 5 Banks have access to substantial quanti-
153. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,415.
154. But cf. Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 413 F.2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1969)
(reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint as to the bank on the ground that agents of
the bank, acting with apparent authority, paid drafts against the plaintiffs' accounts with the bank,
in connection with a fraudulent scheme by officers of the bank who acted outside the scope of
their authority), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
155. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding andAbetting, Con-
spiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnfcation, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 630-31 (1972).
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ties of information about their borrowers' activities and, by virtue of
the covenants in the typical commercial loan agreement, have influence
on their borrowers' activities. The bank's knowledge of or control over
a customer's illegal actions may give rise to aider-and-abettor liability.
A. The Elements of the Offense.
Aiding and abetting a securities law violation is a common law
offense, created by the federal courts rather than by federal statute or
rule. The elements of the offense derive from the Restatement of Torts
and were initially formulated as follows: "Three elements are. . . re-
quired for liability: (1) that an independent wrong exist; (2) that the
aider or abettor know of that wrong's existence; and (3) that substantial
assistance be given in effecting that wrong."'' 5 6 Clearly, a securities law
violation committed by the bank's customer would satisfy the in-
dependent-wrong requirement. The elements of knowledge and sub-
stantial assistance are less clear, although they have been extensively
discussed in a number of cases arising under the securities laws.
Courts have not agreed on the scope of the knowledge require-
ment. Some cases define an aider and abettor's knowledge as a "gen-
eral awareness . . . that [the aider and abettor's] role was part of an
overall activity that is improper,"15 7 but many decisions have defined
the knowledge requirement flexibly.158 Some courts have even held
156. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977).
157. E.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779 (3d Cir. 1976); Woodward
v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp.
189, 195 (N.D. Tex.), aidper curiam, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
158. See, e.g., Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975). In Rochez Bros. a
vice president and former shareholder alleged that the issuing corporation aided and abetted the
securities violation of the issuer's president. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted in
Rochez Bros. that
[iut has been held that liability for aiding and abetting may be found on less than actual
knowledge of the illegal activity .... How much or how little knowledge would seem
to vary with the facts of each case. Courts that have considered the knowledge require-
ment have differed somewhat on its scope.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted). Cf. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780
(3d Cir. 1976) (a complaint charging aiding and abetting of a securities law violation is ordinarily
insufficient if it fails to charge actual knowledge, but actual knowledge is not required when the
alleged aider and abettor derives benefits from, and has either consciousness, or constructive
knowledge, of the violation); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975)
(a bank must possess more knowledge about a routine transaction to be held liable than it must
possess about an unusual transaction). See also IIT, an Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909,
925-26 (2d Cir. 1980) (requiring that there be a conscious intent to aid in the fraud in cases in
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that reckless disregard of readily available evidence of fraud is the legal
equivalent of actual knowledge of a securities law violation. 159
The meaning of "substantial assistance" to another party's securi-
ties fraud is also controversial. Some courts have relied upon the Re-
statement of Torts to determine whether the assistance rendered by an
alleged aider and abettor is substantial. 60 The relevant factors are:
"(1) the amount of assistance given by the defendant; (2) his presence
or absence at the time of the tort; (3) his relation to the other person;
and (4) his state of mind."' t6
A body of case law has developed holding that a party may be
liable as an aider and abettor for silence and inaction. An early aider-
and-abettor case held that there was "not a scrap of authority support-
ing [the] extraordinary theory" that aider-and-abettor liability could be
imposed "on anyone whose conduct consists solely of inaction."' 162
Cases since then have held that silence can be substantial assistance
when there is a duty to disclose.' 63 Even if a bank does not owe a duty
of disclosure to a party, the bank may be liable for aiding and abetting
a fraud by remaining silent if, by its silence, the bank consciously in-
which the defendant's conduct consisted of an omission to speak or act, and in which the defend-
ant had no independent duty to disclose).
159. Tucker v. Janota, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,711, at 94,716
(N.D. Ill. 1978); Felts v. National Account Systems Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 66 (N.D. Miss. 1978);
Lake v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,509, at
93,974 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (the plaintiff failed to prove either actual knowledge or recklessness);
Stem v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 826-27 (E.D. Wis. 1977); cf. Edwards &
Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1979) (the court stated
in dictum that recklessness may substitute for actual knowledge of a securities violation only when
the defendant has a "special relationship" with the plaintiff that is "fiduciary in nature"), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
160. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 163 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974); Saltzman v. Zer, 407 F. Supp. 49, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Odette v. Shearson, Ham-
mill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 876(b) (1977).
161. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 163 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
162. Wessell v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971).
163. See, e.g., Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980). See generally lIT, an Int'l Inv. Trust v. Comfeld,
619 F.2d 909, 925-27 (2d Cir. 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96-97 (5th
Cir. 1975). But see Ruder, supra note 155, at 644 (contending that silence when a duty to disclose
exists is a basis for finding primary liability, not secondary liability as an aider and abettor).
One problem with the duty-to-speak formulation in the cases cited above is that it is difficult
to determine with foresight when or to whom a duty to speak exists, because that duty often arises
out of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged aider and abettor. A bank may
have special relationships with various parties, such as its customers, investors, and loan partici-
pants, any of which, in a particular factual context, may allege a breach of duty based upon the
bank's silence.
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tended to render assistance to a fraud 64 or to derive a benefit there-
from. 1 65
B. Implications for Commercial Lenders.
A brief consideration of some common and not-so-common busi-
ness situations will help illustrate the relevance of the principles de-
scribed above to commercial lenders.
1. Covenant to Maintain Subordinated Debt. A bank is asked to
lend money to a corporate borrower. In reviewing the borrower's bal-
ance sheet the bank notices an item of hundreds of thousands of dollars
in unsecured debt. The borrower explains that for many years it has
operated a savings program in which the borrower's employees buy the
borrower's unsecured promissory notes, relying solely on the integrity
and financial soundness of their employer. The borrower has never
shown financial statements to its employees in connection with its sav-
ings program, nor have the notes been registered under the Securities
Act of 1933.166
The bank agrees to make the loan on the condition that the savings
program be continued and that the company subordinate all debt in-
curred in the savings program to the borrower's obligations to the bank.
Despite the borrower's objection that if it subordinates the notes, the
employees will no longer buy them, the bank makes a secured loan,
effectively subordinating the unsecured notes.
In the three and one-half years that follow, the borrower's
financial condition declines. Finally the bank is forced to foreclose on
its collateral and apply the proceeds to the borrower's outstanding debt
to the bank. The borrower fails to pay the notes issued to its employees
under the savings program.
164. lIT, an Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Con-
solidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir.), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Gould v.
Americin-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780 (3d Cir. 1976); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d
880, 889 (3d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); Sf Hochfelder v.
Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir.) (inaction coupled with affirmative conduct),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154
(7th Cir. 1969) (acquiescence through silence combined with affirmative acts), cer. denied, 397
U.S. 989 (1970).
165. See Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 930 (1978). Although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the bank rendered
substantial assistance to a rule lOb-5 violation by its silence and inaction, a key fact underlying the
decision was the bank's self-interest in encouraging its client to borrow from the client's employees
on a subordinated basis while the bank was a secured creditor. See also Green v. Jonhop, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Or. 1973) (the silence and inaction of an issuer, which had knowledge of
misleading sales and earnings projections by its market maker and principal underwriter, en-
couraged investors to rely on such projections).
166. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
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On facts substantially like these, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co. 167 affirmed a
jury verdict that held a bank liable as an aider and abettor of its cus-
tomer's fraud. The court found evidence of liability in a "combination
of knowledge and action by the Bank."' 168 The bank not only required
that the company subordinate the notes held by the employees, but also
knew that the company did not intend to disclose this fact to the em-
ployees. Although either element alone might not have been enough,
together they sufficed to show the bank's complicity as an aider and
abettor.
2. Raising Additional Capital Through an Offering of Securities.
The borrower is in poor financial condition and requires additional
working capital. The bank warns the borrower that unless it improves
its financial condition the bank will terminate its credit arrangements.
With the bank's knowledge, the borrower engages in a private place-
ment of preferred stock. In connection with the offering, the bank
agrees to waive all existing defaults of the borrower under the credit
arrangement between the bank and the borrower. The bank refuses,
however, to modify the loan agreement or waive any future violations.
As the loan agreement requires, the borrower shows the bank all
offering literature used in the private placement. The private place-
ment memorandum discloses neither past defaults and waivers under
the bank loan nor the troubled state of the relationship between the
bank and the borrower. An officer of the bank reviews the offering
memorandum but does not insist on any changes.
Six months after the offering is completed, after the borrower has
continued to incur operating losses, the bank calls a default and real-
izes on its collateral. The purchasers of the preferred stock then sue the
borrower for violating rule 1Ob-5 and sue the bank for aiding and abet-
ting that violation.
If a reasonable investor would have found the omitted information
material, the bank may be liable as an aider and abettor if there is a
purchaser to whom the bank owed a duty of disclosure because of a
fiduciary relationship or if the bank consciously intended to assist the
issuer in its fraud by remaining silent after it learned of the facts giving
rise to the violation of rule lOb-5.169
167. 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
168. Id. at 802.
169. "Conscious intent" on the part of a corporate defendant may be shown by circumstantial
evidence. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974). The derivation by the bank of a
financial benefit from the transaction might show such an intent.
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3. The Leveraged Tax Shelter. A company raises capital for its oil
and gas drilling ventures by forming and selling interests in limited
partnerships. The partnership interests are attractive to investors be-
cause a bank is willing to give them non-recourse financing, which in-
creases the investor's tax basis in his partnership interest and therefore
increases his allowable tax deductions.
The partnership passes the capital raised in its offering of limited
partnership interests to the drilling company, which uses the money to
purchase certificates of deposit of the bank that made the non-recourse
loan. The source of funds for the company's drilling ventures is the
cash generated by successive private placements of limited partnership
interests in successive drilling programs. After it has participated in
these financings for seven years, the bank is advised by counsel to cease
doing so. It declines to finance the current drilling program; for a fee it
finds another bank to provide the loan.
The promoters of the current limited partnership tell investors that
the bank had financed the prior drilling programs. They do not claim
that the bank is financing the current one. As the bank has no direct
involvement in the transaction, it does not review the prospectus for the
current drilling program. Shortly after the current placement is com-
pleted, the parent drilling company files for voluntary bankruptcy. In-
vestors in the current drilling program sue the promoters, the bank, and
its officers under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933170 and sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 171 The bank and the officers move for dis-
missal, alleging that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
In Vogel v. Trahan172 the court denied such a motion. Notwith-
standing the uncontroverted affidavits of the bank officers that neither
they nor the bank had any direct involvement in the current offering, in
which all plaintiffs had invested, the court ruled that they could be held
liable as aiders and abettors. 173 The district court did not explain its
reasoning. Arguably the decision is incorrect.
4. "Shark Repellant." A dissident shareholder group has an-
nounced that it will wage a proxy contest with management for control
of a company. Management requests a loan from the bank to establish
170. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
172. [1980 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,303, at 97,075 (E.D. Pa. 1980). A
motion to dismiss the bank on grounds of improper venue under the National Bank Act of 1864,
ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 19, 31 U.S.C.), however, was granted.
173. [1980 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 97,083.
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an Employee Stock Ownership Plan. Management advises the bank
that it is initiating the plan to strengthen its hand in the forthcoming
proxy fight.
In connection with the proposed loan, the bank requests and re-
ceives management's draft proxy statement. The bank's counsel re-
views the proxy statement and advises the bank that it contains several
material deficiencies. The bank and its counsel call management and
its counsel and advise them of the deficiencies in the draft proxy state-
ment. Management agrees to make the necessary corrections, and the
bank makes the loan on management's assurances that it will make the
changes. The changes are not made or are inadequately made. The
dissident shareholders sue management under section 14 of the 1934
Act 174 for making a false and fraudulent proxy solicitation and sue the
bank for aiding and abetting that violation. Although there was an
independent securities law violation and knowledge of the potential for
it by the bank, there was probably no substantial assistance in the vio-
lation. The bank spoke up in an effort to prevent the violation and
clearly did not consciously intend that a false proxy statement be dis-
tributed to shareholders. At worst, the bank was negligent in failing to
police management's correction of its proxy statement. Whether that
negligence is enough to hold the bank liable as an aider and abettor
under section 14 remains to be seen.
C. Bank Precautions to Avoid Liability.
As indicated above, banks that have financing arrangements with
public companies or companies engaged in securities transactions may
often find themselves in situations that could result in aider-and-abet-
tor liability. Banks that do not choose to withdraw totally from this
field must therefore scrutinize the transactions they finance. The para-
dox in this area of the law, however, is that the more a bank learns, the
greater the likelihood that it can be held liable for the conduct of its
borrower. The solution for a bank is to voice quickly any objection it
has to the unlawful conduct of its customers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Banks have increasingly been joined as defendants in suits brought
under the securities laws because of their involvement in the transac-
tions of publicly-held corporations. Many of the alleged violations
arise from the banks' use of nonpublic information that customers give
in connection with commercial banking activities. A bank is not dis-
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
1101
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
qualified from dealing with companies that contemplate acquiring an-
other customer about which the bank possesses confidential
information. Yet the bank risks violating the securities laws and
breaching common law duties if it discloses the confidential informa-
tioni to the acquiring company. Courts are not in accord, moreover,
about whether a bank may use the information internally in deciding
whether to finance the acquisition.
Another risk that a bank faces is liability for its trust department's
using confidential information obtained from commercial department
customers. To avoid this conflict, some banks have established Chinese
Walls that cut off the flow of confidential information from the com-
mercial department to the trust department. This solution is not satis-
factory because the trust department, as a professional trustee, has an
obligation to use all the information at the disposal of the bank in mak-
ing its investment decisions, as long as the use of the information is not
illegal. Although a breach of confidentiality may violate the securities
laws if the information so obtained is used in connection with a deci-
sion to buy or to sell securities, the use of the information is legal in a
decision not to buy or not to sell securities. The advocates of the Chi-
nese Wall overlook the trustee's duty to make all legal uses of confiden-
tial information. The recent adoption by the Securities and Exchange
Commission of an antifraud rule for tender offers may require banks to
establish Chinese Walls to avoid liability under the rule. Establishing a
Chinese Wall under the pressure of this rule, however, does not remove
the problems of the conflicting duties that prompt the creation of a Chi-
nese Wall.
A final area of concern is potential aider-and-abettor liability of a
bank for its customers' securities law violations. Banks have been held
liable both when they have remained silent after learning of a cus-
tomer's fraud, and when they have actively furthered the fraud. The
only clear way for a bank to avoid aider-and-abettor liability is to pro-
test such conduct immediately and, if necessary, terminate its relation-
ship with a customer that is violating the securities laws.
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